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Abstract—With the proliferation of distributed generators
and energy storage systems, traditional passive consumers in
power systems have been gradually evolving into the so-called
“prosumers”, i.e., proactive consumers, which can both produce
and consume power. To encourage energy exchange among
prosumers, energy sharing is increasingly adopted, which is
usually formulated as a generalized Nash game (GNG). In this
paper, a distributed approach is proposed to seek the Generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the energy sharing game. To this end,
we first reveal by proof that the GNG is generally not monotone.
In such a situation, the pseudo-gradient of the disutilities is
not monotone, which makes existing methods inapplicable. To
overcome this obstacle, we convert the GNG into an equivalent
optimization problem. A Krasnosel’skiiˇ-Mann iteration type algo-
rithm is thereby devised to solve the problem and consequently
find the GNE in a distributed manner. We further prove the
convergence of the proposed distributed algorithm based on the
nonexpansive operator theory. The performance of the algorithm
is validated by experiments with three prosumers, and the
scalability is tested by simulations using 123 prosumers.
Index Terms—Energy sharing, prosumer, distributed algo-
rithm, generalized Nash game, generalized Nash Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been recognized that our power system is undergo-
ing a fundamental transition due to: 1) The proliferation of
distributed generations (DGs), such as wind turbines, pho-
tovoltaics, energy storage systems and electric vehicles [1]–
[5]; 2) The advancement of communications and control in
consumer-level via smart appliances and energy management
systems [6]–[8]. Together, these changes allow traditional
passive consumers to convert into the so-called “prosumers”,
i.e., proactive consumers, that can actively regulate their gener-
ation and consumption [9]–[13]. Conventionally, a hierarchical
structure is utilized in the power system energy management,
usually in a centralized way. However, the centralized manner
may face great challenges raised by the ever-increasing num-
ber of prosumers and uncertainties of renewable generations.
This essentially advocates a distributed paradigm [14]–[17]
in energy management. Particularly, energy sharing turns to
be a promising form of the market that encourages energy
trading among prosumers. As prosumers typically belong to
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different owners, the inherent competition may lead to strategic
behaviors in energy sharing. In this situation, each prosumer
intends to optimize its own profit while maintaining the power
balance over the whole system. This leads to a generalized
Nash game (GNG) with global constraints. In this regard, it is
desirable to investigate distributed approaches to seeking the
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the GNG.
There are many papers investigating distributed methods
of GNE seeking, which can be roughly divided into two
categories in terms of methods used: gradient-based algorithms
[18]–[23], and proximal-point algorithms [24]–[27]. In the
first type, the pseudo-gradient of each player’s disutility func-
tion is utilized to seek the GNE, including continuous-time
algorithms [18], [19] and discrete algorithms [20]–[23]. In
[18], a distributed continuous-time projection-based algorithm
is proposed to seek the GNE of aggregative games with
linear coupled constraints. This is extended to the case where
players have nonsmooth payoff functions in [19]. In [20], two
distributed primal-dual algorithms are proposed for computing
a GNE in noncooperative games with shared affine constraints.
The operator splitting method is utilized to prove the con-
vergence of the algorithms. It is further improved in [21]
to consider communication time delays and partial-decision
information. In [22], three stochastic gradient strategies are
developed to seek GNE where agents are subject to random-
ness in the environment of unknown statistical distribution. In
[23], the relations between Nash and Wardrop equilibria of
the aggregative game are investigated and two algorithms are
proposed to seek the equilibrium.
In the proximal-point algorithms, the Alternating Direction
Method of Multipliers (ADMM) method is widely used. An
inexact-ADMM algorithm is proposed in [24]. This method
is improved in [27], where each player only has partial
information of their opponents and the communication graph is
not necessarily the same as the cost dependency graph of each
player. In [25], two double-layer preconditioned proximal-
point algorithms are proposed to seek GNE with both coupled
equality and inequality constraints, respectively. For the GNG
with a special structure, i.e., the coupling in the cost functions
of the agents is linear, a distributed proximal-point algorithm is
developed in [26] for GNG with maximally monotone pseudo-
gradient.
The aforementioned works have made great progress in the
context of distributed GNE seeking. Generally, the pseudo-
gradient of the pay-off function is assumed to be monotone
[19], maximally monotone [25], [26], strictly monotone [18],
strongly monotone [20]–[23], [27] or even cocoercive [24].
However, in the energy sharing game among prosumers, the
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2pseudo-gradient does not satisfy the above assumptions, which
makes existing methods inapplicable. In this paper, we offer a
different perspective for seeking the GNE in the GNG. Instead
of dealing with the GNG directly, we alternatively solve an
equivalent optimization problem of the original game problem.
Our main contributions are as follows.
• We prove that, in the energy sharing game, the pseudo-
gradient of the disutilities is generally non-monotone.
It theoretically reveals that why the existing distributed
algorithms for GNE seeking [18]–[27], which are built
on the monotone assumption, do not apply when solving
the energy sharing game problem.
• To solve such a non-monotone game problem in a dis-
tributed way, we transform the energy sharing game into
an equivalent optimization problem. Then, a distributed
method is devised based on Krasnosel’skiiˇ-Mann iteration
to solve the equivalent counterpart instead of solving
the original game problem directly. By constructing a
firmly nonexpansive operator, we prove that the proposed
distributed algorithm converges to the GNE of the original
energy sharing game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we briefly introduce some necessary preliminaries. Section
III formulates the energy sharing model. In Section IV, key
properties of the energy sharing game are analyzed including
monotonicity and existence of GNE. A distributed GNE seek-
ing algorithm is proposed in Section V. The convergence of
the algorithm is proved in Section VI. The effectiveness of
the algorithm is verified in Section VII by experiments and
simulation studies. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, use Rn to denote the n-dimensional Euclidean
space. For a matrix A, [Aij ] is the entry in the i-th row and j-
th column of A. For vectors x, y ∈ Rn, xTy = 〈x, y〉 denotes
the inner product of x, y. ‖x‖2 =
√
xTx denotes the Euclidean
norm of x. Denote the inner product under a positive definite
matrix Q by 〈x, y〉Q = 〈Qx, y〉. Similarly, the norm induced
by Q is ‖x‖Q =
√〈Qx, x〉. The following relationship holds
for a Q-induced norm.
‖a− c‖2Q − ‖b− c‖2Q = 2〈a− b, a− c〉Q − ‖a− b‖2Q (1)
which can be obtained by the equation ‖a + b‖2Q = ‖a‖2Q +
2〈a, b〉Q + ‖b‖2Q.
The identity matrix with dimension n is denoted by In. Use∏n
i=1 Ωi to denote the Cartesian product of the sets Ωi, i =
1, · · · , n. Define the projection of x onto a set Ω as
PΩ(x) = arg min
y∈Ω
‖x− y‖2 (2)
Use Id to denote the identity operator, i.e., Id(x) = x, ∀x.
Define NΩ(x) = {v| 〈v, y − x〉 ≤ 0,∀y ∈ Ω}. We have
PΩ(x) = (Id +NΩ)−1(x) [28, Chapter 23.1].
For a single-valued operator T : Ω ⊂ Rn → Rn,
a point x ∈ Ω is a fixed point of T if T (x) ≡ x.
The set of fixed points of T is denoted by Fix(T ). T
is nonexpansive if ‖T (x)− T (y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖ ,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
For α ∈ (0, 1), T is called α-averaged if there exists a
nonexpansive operator R such that T = (1 − α)Id + αR.
Use A(α) to denote the class of α-averaged operators. If
T ∈ A( 12 ), T is called firmly nonexpansive. The graph ofT is gra T = {(x, u) ∈ Rn ×Rn|u ∈ T (x)}. T is monotone
if ∀(x, u), ∀(y, v) ∈ gra T , 〈x−y, u−v〉 ≥ 0. T is maximally
monotone if gra T is not strictly contained in the graph of any
other monotone operator.
III. ENERGY SHARING GAME
In this section, the model of prosumers is introduced. Then,
we formulate the energy sharing game.
A. Model of prosumers
In this paper, we consider the energy sharing problem
among a set of prosumers, denoted by N = {1, 2, ...n}.
The communication edge is denoted by E ⊆ N × N . For
a prosumer i, the set of its neighbors is denoted by Ni. If
j ∈ Ni, prosumers i and j can communicate directly. The
Laplacian matrix of the communication graph is denoted by
L and we have 1TL = 0, where 1 is a vector with all of the
components as 1.
The scenario is that each prosumer has a power shortage or
surplus, denoted by Di. To balance its power, it can produce
power itself, denoted by pi, or buy power from (sell power
to) the grid, denoted by qi. In the sharing market, the demand
function of each prosumer can be expressed by
qi = aiµc + bi (3)
where µc is the market clearing price, bi is the willingness
to buy. ai < 0 implies the price elasticity. The market clears
when the net quantity
∑
i qi = 0 and the obtained sharing
price is1
µc = − 1
Tb
1Ta
= −1
Tb
Na
(4)
where a = 1
Ta
N is the average value of ai. In the rest of the
paper, b−i := (b1, b2, · · · , bi−1, bi+1, · · · , bn)T.
B. Energy sharing game
In the energy sharing game, each prosumer intends to
minimize its cost while maintaining the global power balance.
The optimization problem of each prosumer is
min
pi,bi
fi(pi, b) = hi(pi) + (aiµc(b) + bi)µc(b) (5a)
s.t. pi + aiµc(b) + bi = Di, λi (5b)∑
i∈N
(aiµc(b) + bi) = 0, ηi (5c)
p
i
≤ pi ≤ pi (5d)
The disutility function consists of two parts, where hi(pi)
are the cost of prosumer i to produce pi and (aiµc(b) +
bi)µc(b) = qiµc(b) are the cost of buying power qi. λi, ηi are
1Given a collection of zi for i in a certain set Z, z denotes the column
vector z := (zi, i ∈ Z) with a proper dimension with zi as its components.
3the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints (5b) and (5c),
respectively.
Regarding the energy sharing game (5), we have following
assumptions.
Assumption 1. The functions hi(pi) are convex and differen-
tiable.
Assumption 2. For a given b−i, the Slater’s condition of the
problem (5) holds [29, Chapter 5.2.3], i.e., problem (5) is
feasible.
Assumption 3. The generation satisfies 1Tp < 1TD < 1Tp.
The Assumption 3 implies that the energy production can
strictly satisfy the load demand. There is at least one p
i
<
pi < pi in the steady state.
In summary, the energy sharing game among all prosumers
is composed of the following elements:
• Player: all prosumers, denoted by N = {1, 2, ...n};
• Strategy: generation power pi and power interaction bi;
• Payoff: the disutility function fi(pi, b),∀i ∈ N .
The GNE (p∗, b∗) of the game in (5) is defined as:
(p∗i , b
∗
i ) ∈ arg min fi(pi, bi, b∗−i), s.t. (5b), (5b), (5c), ∀i ∈ N
Remark 1. The energy sharing game model (5) basically
comes from [13], and is modified by additionally considering
local capacity constraints (5d). Mathematically, the energy
sharing game (5) is indeed a GNG by noting that the global
constraint (5c) couples the strategies of players. As proved in
[13], if the constraint (5d) is not taken into account, the GNG
can be equivalently converted into a standard Nash game with
a unique Nash equilibrium. However, when (5d) is considered,
it is not trivial to eliminate the coupling constraints. This is the
key difference between this paper and [13] in the modeling.
The pseudo-gradient of fi(pi, b),∀i ∈ N , denoted by
F (p, b), is defined as
F (p, b) = col (∇p1,b1f1(p1, b), · · · ,∇pN ,bN fN (pN , b)) (6)
where col (x1, · · · , xn) is the column vector stacked with
column vectors x1, · · · , xn.
Recently, many papers investigate distributed algorithms of
GNE seeking. In these works, a key assumption is that the
pseudo-gradient of the disutility is monotone. However, the
energy sharing game suffers from a non-monotone pseudo-
gradient of the disutility, which does not satisfy this condition.
Therefore, it could be solved in a distributed way by the simple
application of existing methods. This will be explained in
detail in the next section.
The solution approach to seeking the GNE and the relation
between the associated theoretic results are illustrated in Fig.1.
The main idea is that we transform GNG to a corresponding
optimization problem, and then design a distributed algorithm
to solve the problem. Consequently, the GNE is obtained.
IV. KEY PROPERTIES OF THE ENERGY SHARING GAME
In this section, we first show that the pseudo-gradient of the
disutility function (5a) is generally not monotone. Then, we
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Fig. 1. Proposed solution strategy for solving the energy sharing game.
analyze the property of the Nash equilibrium and transform
the game into an equivalent optimization problem.
A. Monotonic analysis
Replacing µc in (5) using (4), then the sharing game
problem (5) can be rewritten as
min
pi,bi
fi(pi, b) = hi(pi) + gi(bi, b−i) (7a)
s.t. pi +
1Ta− ai
1Ta
bi − ai
1Ta
∑
j 6=i
bj = Di, λi (7b)
p
i
≤ pi ≤ pi (7c)
where
gi(bi, b−i) = (aiµc(b) + bi)µc(b)
= −
1Ta− ai
1Ta
bi − ai
1Ta
∑
j 6=i
bj
 bi +∑j 6=i bj
1Ta
=
ai − 1Ta
N2a2
b2i +
(
2ai − 1Ta
N2a2
)
bi
∑
j 6=i
bj
+
ai
N2a2
(∑
j 6=i
bj
)2
= αib
2
i + βibi
∑
j 6=i
bj + δi
(∑
j 6=i
bj
)2
(8)
where
αi =
ai − 1Ta
N2a2
, βi =
2ai − 1Ta
N2a2
, δi =
ai
N2a2
(9)
Because ai < 0, we have αi > 0, βi > 0, δi < 0. Then,
gi(bi, b−i) is strictly convex with respect to bi given any b−i.
Regarding disutility function (7a), we have the following
results.
Theorem 1. The pseudo-gradient defined in (6) is generally
non-monotone.
Proof. For the first part of fi(pi, b), because hi(pi) is convex
and only determined by prosumer i, its gradient and pseudo-
gradient are the same and monotone.
4For the second part of fi(pi, b), the pseudo-gradient of
gi(b), i ∈ N is
G(b) = col (∇b1g1(b1, b−1), · · · ,∇bN gN (bN , b−N ))
= col
2αibi + βi∑
j 6=i
bj

= Ab (10)
where
[A]ij =
{
2αi, j = i
βi, j 6= i (11)
Recalling the definition of αi, βi in (9), the matrix A cannot
be guaranteed positively definite. Therefore, the condition (x−
y)TAT(x − y) ≥ 0 does not hold for ∀x ≥ y. This implies
G(b) is generally non-monotone, which completes the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that the pseudo-gradient of fi(pi, b) does
not satisfy the most fundamental assumption in existing works.
This makes existing distributed GNE seeking methods unable
to be applied, which are applicable only to monotone games
[18]–[27]. In the rest of the paper, we will first transform the
game (7) into an equivalent optimization problem and then
propose a distributed approach to solving it.
B. Existence of GNE
Define the sets
Ωi :=
{
pi | pi ≤ pi ≤ pi
}
, Ω =
∏n
i=1
Ωi (12)
and
Xei :=
(pi, bi) | pi + 1Ta− ai1Ta bi − ai1Ta∑
j 6=i
bj = Di

(13)
Xe =
∏n
i=1
Xei , Xi = Ωi ∩Xei , X = Ω ∩Xe (14)
For any given b−i, the feasible set of prosumer i, Xi, is
closed and convex. Then, we have the following result.
Lemma 2. If assumptions 1 and 2 hold, a point (p, b) is an
equilibrium if and only if it is a solution of the variational
inequality V I(X,F (p, b))2.
Proof. For any given b−i, the disutility function (7a) is con-
tinuous, differentiable and convex with respect to (pi, bi).
Moreover, the feasible set Xi is closed and convex. Thus, we
have this assertion by [30, Theorem 3.3].
For the existence and uniqueness of the GNE, we have the
following results.
Theorem 3. If Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, for the
generalized Nash game (7), we have
1) the generalized Nash equilibrium exists;
2) if the Assumption 3 also holds, the generalized Nash
equilibrium is unique.
2The variational inequality problem VI (X,F (x)) is to find a vector x ∈ X
such that (y − x)TF (x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X [30].
Proof. ⇒ 1) From Lemma 2, we need to find x∗ := (p∗i , b∗i ) ∈
X such that
〈F (x∗) , x− x∗〉 ≥ 0,∀x ∈ X (15)
Now, we check the KKT condition for V I(X,F (p, b)) in
(15). In fact, x∗ is a solution to V I(X,F (p, b)) in (15) if and
only if x∗ is the optimal solution to the following optimization
problem:
min
x∈R2n
〈F (x∗) , x〉 , s.t. x ∈ X (16)
If x∗ solves (16), there exists λ∗ ∈ R such that the following
optimality conditions (KKT) are satisfied [31, Theorem 3.25]
0 ∈ h′i(p∗i ) + λ∗i +NΩi (p∗i ) (17a)
0 = − (2aiµc + b∗i + aiλ∗i )
1
1Ta
+ µc + λ
∗
i (17b)
0 = p∗i + aiµ
∗
c + b
∗
i −Di (17c)
0 = 1Taµ∗c + b
∗
i +
∑
j 6=i
b∗j (17d)
From (17b), we know
0 = − (2aiµ∗c + b∗i + aiλ∗i )
1
1Ta
+ µ∗c + λ
∗
i
⇒ λ∗i =
1Ta− 2ai
ai − 1Ta
µ∗c −
1
ai − 1Ta
b∗i (18)
From (17c), we know
b∗i = Di − p∗i − aiµ∗c (19)
Combining (18) and (19), we have
λ∗i =
1Ta− 2ai
ai − 1Ta
µ∗c −
Di − p∗i − aiµ∗c
ai − 1Ta
= −µ∗c +
p∗i
ai − 1Ta
− Di
ai − 1Ta
(20)
Then, the KKT condition (17) is
0 ∈ h′i(p∗i ) +
p∗i
ai − 1Ta
− Di
ai − 1Ta
− µ∗c +NΩi (p∗i ) (21a)
0 =
∑
i∈N
Di −
∑
i∈N
pi (21b)
It is also the KKT condition of the following problem
min
p
hˆ(p) =
∑
i∈N
(
hi(pi) +
p2i
2(ai − 1Ta)
− Di
ai − 1Ta
pi
)
(22a)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
pi =
∑
i∈N
Di, µc (22b)
p
i
≤ pi ≤ pi (22c)
where µc is the Lagrangian multiplier.
Define
h˜i(pi) = hi(pi) +
p2i
2(ai − 1Ta)
− Di
ai − 1Ta
pi (23)
We know h˜i(pi) is strongly convex and the Slater’s condition
holds by Assumption 2. Thus, p∗i and µ
∗
c exist. By (19), b
∗
i
5also exists.
⇒ 2) If Assumption 3 holds, there exists at least one
prosumer i with p
i
< p∗i < pi. For this i, we have
{0} = NΩi (p∗i ). Then, by (21a), µ∗c is unique. The unique
b∗i can be obtained from (19).
Remark 2. As explained in Section IV.A, the game (7)
is difficult to solve by existing methods due to the non-
monotone pseudo-gradient. Now, we can alternatively consider
the equivalent counterpart (22), which could be solved in a
distributed way as long as 1Ta is known3. In this regard, we
require that the market coordinator (or a third-part platform)
broadcasts the sum of ai of all prosumers. That is needed
merely when new prosumers join or existing ones quit, which
can be known by the market coordinator or the third-part
platform. After getting p∗i , b
∗
i can be obtained from (19). Then,
the energy sharing game problem (7) can be solved.
V. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING
In this section, we first propose a distributed algorithm
based on Krasnosel’skiiˇ-Mann iteration to solve the problem
(22), i.e., to solve the generalized game (7). Then, we use the
nonexpansive operator theory to prove the convergence of the
proposed algorithm.
A. Algorithm design
Before giving the algorithm, we first define a matrix and a
function. Define the matrix
Θ :=
 Γ 0 −In0 α−1z In −L
−In −L α−1µ In
 (24)
where the matrix Γ = diag(γi). γi, αz and αµ are constant to
make Θ positive definite4.
Define the function
Hi(pi) =
∂h˜i
∂pi
(pi) + γipi (25)
We have the follow result.
Lemma 4. The function Hi(pi) is strictly monotone. More-
over, its inverse function H−1i (pi) exists and is also strictly
monotone.
The proof is straightforward as h˜i(pi) is strongly convex,
which is omitted here.
We propose the following algorithm, which is denoted by
SGNE (Seeking the Generalized Nash Equilibrium).
The algorithm has the Krasnosel’skiiˇ-Mann iteration type
[28, Chapter 5], which consists of two phases: prediction phase
and update phase. In the prediction phase, each bus uses the
local stored information of the last two steps to get predictive
variables by a linear extrapolation. In the update phase, the
predictive variables are utilized to proceed the next iteration.
3The “equivalent” here means that we can first solve (22) to get p∗, µ∗c ,
and then get b∗ with (19), i.e., the GNE is obtained.
4It should be note that such γi, σz , σµ always exist to make Θ diagonally
dominant, or positive definite.
Algorithm 1 SGNE
Prediction phase:
For prosumer i, it computes
p˜i,t = pi,t + η(pi,t − pi,t−1) (26a)
z˜i,t = zi,t + η(zi,t − zi,t−1) (26b)
µ˜i,t = µi,t + η(µi,t − µi,t−1) (26c)
Update phase:
For prosumer i, it computes
pi,t+1 =
[
H−1(γip˜i,t − µ˜i,t)
]pi
p
i
(26d)
Communicate with its neighbors j ∈ Ni to get µ˜j,t, and
compute
zi,t+1 = z˜i,t − σz
∑
j∈Ni
(µ˜i,t − µ˜j,t) (26e)
Communicate with its neighbors j ∈ Ni to get z˜j,t, zj,t+1, and
compute
µi,t+1 = µ˜i,t + σµ
(
2pi,t+1 − p˜i,t −Di
+ 2
∑
j∈Ni
(zi,t+1 − zj,t+1)−
∑
j∈Ni
(z˜i,t − z˜j,t)
)
(26f)
In the algorithm, only communications with neighbors are
needed, which means that it is fully distributed.
B. Algorithm reformulation
From (26d), we know
H−1(γip˜i,t − µ˜i,t)

≤ pi,t+1, pi,t+1 = pi
= pi,t+1, pi < pi,t+1 < pi≥ pi,t+1, pi,t+1 = pi
(27)
Because H−1i (pi) is monotone, we have
H(pi,t+1)− γip˜i,t + µ˜i,t

≥ 0, pi,t+1 = pi
= 0, p
i
< pi,t+1 < pi
≤ 0, pi,t+1 = pi
(28)
It is equivalent to
pi,t+1 = PΩi
(
pi,t+1 − αp(∇h˜i(pi,t+1)
+γi(pi,t+1 − p˜i,t) + µ˜i,t) (29)
Recalling PΩ(x) = (Id +NΩ)−1(x), we have
γi(p˜i,t − pi,t+1)− µ˜i,t + µi,t+1 ∈ NΩi(pi,t+1)
+∇h˜i(pi,t+1) + µi,t+1 (30)
From (26e), we have
σ−1z (z˜i,t − zi,t+1)−
∑
j∈Ni
(µ˜i,t − µ˜j,t)
+
∑
j∈Ni
(µi,t+1 − µj,t+1) =
∑
j∈Ni
(µi,t+1 − µj,t+1)
(31)
6From (26f), we have
σ−1µ (µ˜i,t − µi,t+1) +
∑
j∈Ni
(zi,t+1 − zj,t+1)
−
∑
j∈Ni
(z˜i,t − z˜j,t) + pi,t+1 − p˜i,t
= −pi,t+1 +Di −
∑
j∈Ni
(zi,t+1 − zj,t+1) (32)
The compact form of the algorithm is
p˜t = pt + η(pt − pt−1) (33a)
z˜t = zt + η(zt − zt−1) (33b)
µ˜t = µt + η(µt − µt−1) (33c)
Γ(p˜t − pt+1)− (µ˜t − µt+1) ∈ NΩ(pt+1)
+∇h˜(pt+1) + µt+1 (33d)
σ−1z (z˜t − zt+1)− L(µ˜t − µt+1) = Lµt+1 (33e)
σ−1µ (µ˜t − µt+1)− L(z˜t − zt+1)
− (p˜t − pt+1) = −pt+1 +D − Lzt+1 (33f)
Define the following operator
U :
 pz
µ
 7→
 µ+NΩ(p) +∇h˜(p)Lµ
−p+D − Lz
 (34)
Then, the algorithm (33) is rewritten as
ω˜t = ωt + η(ωt − ωt−1) (35a)
Θ(ω˜t − ωt+1) ∈ U(ωt+1) (35b)
where Θ is defined in (24). For the operator U , it has the
following properties
Lemma 5. Take step sizes Γ, αz and αµ such that Θ is positive
definite We have following properties.
1) Operator U is maximally monotone;
2) Θ−1U is maximally monotone under the Θ-induced
norm ‖ · ‖Θ;
3) (Id + Θ−1U)−1 exists and is firmly nonexpansive.
Proof. 1): The operator U can be rewritten as
U =
 0 0 I0 0 L
−I −L 0
 pz
µ
+
 NΩ(p) +∇h˜(p)0
D

= U1 + U2 (36)
As U1 is a skew-symmetric matrix, U1 is maximally mono-
tone [28, Example 20.35]. Moreover, NΩ(z) is maximally
monotone by [28, Example 20.26]. In addition, 0 and D are
monotone and continuous, which are all maximally monotone
[28, Corollary 20.28]. As h˜(p) is convex, ∇h˜(p) is also
maximally monotone [28, Theorem 20.25]. Thus, U2 is also
maximally monotone. Then, by [28, Corollary 25.5],we have
U is maximally monotone.
2) As Θ is symmetric positive definite and U is maximally
monotone, we can prove that Θ−1U is maximally monotone
under the Θ-induced norm by the similar analysis in Lemma
5.6 of [20].
3) As Φ−1U is maximally monotone, (Id+Φ−1U)−1 exists
and is firmly nonexpansive by [28, Proposition 23.8].
By the third assertion of Lemma 5, (35) is equivalent to
ω˜t = ωt + η(ωt − ωt−1) (37a)
ωt+1 = (Id + Θ
−1U)−1ω˜ (37b)
Up to now, we transform the algorithm SGNE to a fixed point
problem with a nonexpansive operator (Id+Θ−1U)−1, which
provides fundamental support for the convergence proof.
VI. NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING AND CONVERGENCE
In this section, we address the optimality of the equilibrium
point and the convergence of the algorithm SGNE, i.e., the
discrete dynamic system (26).
A. Nash Equilibrium
First, we define the equilibrium of the algorithm SGNE.
Definition 1. A point w∗ = (w∗i , i ∈ N ) = (p∗i , z∗i , µ∗i ) is an
equilibrium point of (26) if lim
t→+∞wi,t = w
∗
i holds for all i.
Recalling the (19), and we have the following result.
Theorem 6. Suppose assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. At the
equilibrium of the algorithm SGNE, we have µ∗i = µ
∗
j =
µ0,∀i, j is the clearing price and (p∗, b∗) is the GNE of the
game, where µ0 is constant.
Proof. From Definition 1 and (33), we have
0 ∈ NΩ(p∗) +∇h˜(p∗) + µ∗ (38a)
0 = Lµ∗ (38b)
0 = −p∗ +D − Lz∗ (38c)
From (38b), we have
µ∗i = µ
∗
j = µ0,∀i, j (39)
From (38c), we have
0 = −1Tp∗ + 1TD − 1TLz∗ = −1Tp∗ + 1TD (40)
The equations (38a), (39) and (40) are the KKT condition (21).
This completes the proof.
B. Convergence
In this subsection, we analyze the convergence of the
algorithm SGNE based on the compact form (37). First, we
give the following result.
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold.
Given a parameter η satisfying 0 < η < 13 and the step sizes
Γ, αz and αµ such that Θ is positive definite. Then with
SGNE, wt converges to a primal-dual optimal solution ω∗ of
the problem (22). Then, (p∗, b∗) is the GNE of (7).
Proof. Frist, we prove that lim
t→∞(ωt+1 − ωt) = 0. Given any
equilibrium point ω∗, use the equation (1), and we have
‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ
7= 2〈ωt − ωt+1, ωt − ω∗〉Θ − ‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ
= 2〈ωt − ωt+1, ωt+1 − ω∗〉Θ + ‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ
= ‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ + 2〈ω˜t − ωt+1, ωt+1 − ω∗〉Θ
− 2η〈ωt − ωt−1, ωt+1 − ω∗〉Θ (41)
where the last equation is derived by integrating (37a).
By (35b), we have
0 ∈ U(ω∗) (42)
Since U is maximally monotone, we have
〈Θ(ω˜t − ωt+1), ωt+1 − ω∗〉 ≥ 0 (43)
Thus, we have
‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ
≤ 2η〈ωt − ωt−1, ωt+1 − ω∗〉Θ − ‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ
(44)
Moreover,
η(‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt−1 − ω∗‖2Θ)
= η(2〈ωt − ωt−1, ωt − ω∗〉Θ − ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ)
(45)
From (44) and (45), we have
‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ
− η(‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt−1 − ω∗‖2Θ)
≤ 2η〈ωt − ωt−1, ωt+1 − ω∗〉Θ − ‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ
− η(2〈ωt − ωt−1, ωt − ω∗〉Θ − ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ)
= −‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ + 2η〈ωt − ωt−1, ωt+1 − ωt〉Θ
+ η ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ
≤ (η − 1) ‖ωt − ωt+1‖2Θ + 2η ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ (46)
Define a sequence sk = ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − η ‖ωt−1 − ω∗‖2Θ +
2η ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ. Then
sk+1 − sk = ‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ
− η(‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt−1 − ω∗‖2Θ)
+ 2η ‖ωt+1 − ωt‖2Θ − 2η ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ
≤ (3η − 1) ‖ωt+1 − ωt‖2Θ (47)
From (47), we have (1 − 3η)∑kt=1 ‖ωt+1 − ωt‖2Θ ≤ s1 −
sk+1 ≤ s1 + η ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ. As 0 < η < 13 , we have sk+1 ≤
sk ≤ s1 and ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − η ‖ωt−1 − ω∗‖2Θ ≤ sk ≤ s1.
Then, ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ ≤ ηk(‖ω1 − ω∗‖2Θ − µ11−α ) + µ11−α , i.e.,
ωt is bounded. Thus, (1 − 3η)
∑k
t=1 ‖ωt+1 − ωt‖2Θ ≤ s1 +
ηk+1(‖ω1 − ω∗‖2Θ − µ11−α ) + ηµ11−α . As 0 < η < 13 , we have∑∞
t=1
‖ωt+1 − ωt‖2Θ <∞ (48)
Thus, lim
t→∞(ωt+1 − ωt) = 0.
Then, we prove that ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ also converges by the
similar analysis in [20, Theorem 6.3]. We also write it here
for completeness.
Denote ϕt = max
{
0, ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ
}
and
ζt = 2η ‖ωt − ωt−1‖2Θ. We know that ϕt is lower bounded.
Recall (46), and we have ϕt+1 ≤ ηϕt + ζt. Apply this
relationship recursively, and we have
ϕt+1 ≤ ηtϕ1 +
t−1∑
i=0
ηiζt−i (49)
Adding both sides of (49) from t = 1→∞, we have
∞∑
i=1
ϕi ≤ ϕ1
1− η +
1
1− η
∞∑
t=1
ζt (50)
From (48), we know
∑∞
t=1 ζt <∞. This implies that
∑∞
t=1 ϕt
is bounded, non-decreasing and converges.
Consider another sequence
{
‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ −
∑t
i=1 ϕi
}
,
which is lower bounded. Moreover,
‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ −
k+1∑
i=1
ϕi = ‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ − ϕk+1 −
t∑
i=1
ϕi
≤ ‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ − ‖ωt+1 − ω∗‖2Θ + ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ −
t∑
i=1
ϕi
= ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ −
t∑
i=1
ϕi
This implies that
{
‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ −
∑t
i=1 ϕi
}
is a non-
increasing sequence and also converges. ‖ωt − ω∗‖2Θ is the
sum of two convergent sequences, and also converges.
Since ωt is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence ωnt
converging to a point ω˜∗. From lim
t→∞(ωt+1 − ωt) = 0, we
have lim
t→∞(ωnt+1 − ωnt) = 0 and limt→∞(ωnt−1 − ωnt) = 0.
Due to the continuity of the righthand side of (37), we have
ω˜∗ = (Id + Θ−1U)−1ω˜∗. Thus, ω∗ is an equilibrium point of
the sequence ωt. This also implies that ‖ωt − ω˜∗‖2Θ converges.
Because ‖ωnt − ω˜∗‖2Θ converges to zero, ‖ωt − ω˜∗‖2Θ also
converges to zero.
Based on Theorem 6, we have (p∗, b∗) is the GNE of (7).
This completes the proof.
Invoking Theorem 3, if Assumption 3 also holds, the
algorithm will converge to the unique GNE of the generalized
Nash game (7), equivalently the energy sharing game (5).
VII. EXPERIMENTS AND SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, experiments and numerical simulations are
introduced to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
First, experiments with three prosumers are carried out to
illustrate the basic properties of the algorithm. Then, a case
with 123 prosumers is investigated to test the scalability, where
the communication topology is identical to the topology of the
IEEE 123-bus system [32].
A. Experimental results
The proposed method is verified on an experimental plat-
form based on the dSPACE RTI 1202 controller, which is
presented in Fig.2. It is composed of three inverters, one
dSPACE RTI 1202 controller, two switchable loads, and one
host computer. Each inverter represents a prosumer, which can
both produce and consume power. The system topology is
given in Fig.3. In the experiments, the breaker B0 is open,
8Inverter 1 dSPACEInverter 2 Inverter 3
Host computer
Network 
impedance
Breakers
Load 2
Load 1
Network 
impedance
Fig. 2. Experiment platform based on dSPACE RTI 1202 controller
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Z2
Z3
Load1
Load2
Grid
B0
B2
B1Prosumer1
Prosumer2
Prosumer3
Fig. 3. Topology of the experiment system
i.e., the system operates in an isolated mode. One load is
connected at the bus of Prosumer1 and the other is at the
bus of Prosumer2. Three prosumers are connected through
impedances. The communication topology is Prosumer1 ↔
Prosumer2 ↔ Prosumer3 ↔ Prosumer1. The disutility func-
tion is hi(pi) = 12cip
2
i + dipi with c1 = 0.00075, c2 =
0.0006, c3 = 0.001, di = 0. The price elasticity of each
prosumer is set as ai = −1000. The load demand of each
prosumer is D1 = 730W, D2 = 365W, D3 = 0.
The simulation scenario is: 1) at t = 10s, two loads are
connected; 2) at t = 30s, load 2 is disconnected. Then, each
DG regulates its generation to balance the power difference.
The frequency dynamics are illustrated in Fig.4. When loads
are connected, the frequency drops to about 49.2Hz and
recovers to the nominal value in four seconds. On the contrary,
when load 2 is switched off, the frequency increases and
recovers in 3 seconds.
The GNE of the first stage is (p∗1 = 505.4W, b
∗
1 =
103.3W), (p∗2 = 408.4W, b
∗
2 = 355.0W), (p
∗
3 = 177.8W, b
∗
3 =
310.0W). Dynamics of seeking the GNE is illustrated in Fig.5,
where the left part is the generation pi of each prosumer and
the right part is the purchase willingness bi. They vary slightly
around the equilibrium. In this stage, Prosumer1 buys power
from Prosumer2 and Prosumer3. The GNE of the second
stage is (p∗1 = 440.6W, b
∗
1 = −41.7W), (p∗2 = 168.9W, b∗2 =
−310.0W), (p∗3 = 123.9W, b∗3 = −444.2W). Compared with
the results obtained from the centralized method, the steady
state generations are optimal to the problem (22). This shows
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Fig. 4. The frequency dynamics of three DGs
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of the GNE
that the GNE is obtained. Moreover, real power can always
trace the reference value. This verifies that the proposed
method can get the correct results in the experiment. Dy-
namics of the payoff functions are given in Fig.6, which also
converges in five seconds. In the first stage, Prosumer3 earns
profit by selling power to Prosumer1 and Prosumer2. In the
second stage, there is only Prosumer1 buying power, while
others selling. The cost of Prosumer2 changes from positive
to negative, which implies that it earns profit by selling power
to Prosumer1.
B. Scalability
In this subsection, the scalability of proposed method is
illustrated. The 123 prosumers is numbered with the same
number of IEEE 123-bus system. ci in the disutility function
is ci = 1 + i123 and di = 1. ai of these 123 prosumers are
all −0.1. The effect of η is also investigated, which is set as
0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.33 respectively. The convergence of pi,t to the
equilibrium point is given in Fig.7. With η = 0, it takes more
than 20, 000 iterations to make the relative error smaller than
1%. With η = 0.33, it takes about 14, 000 iterations, which is
reduced by 30%. It is also observed that a larger η results in
a higher convergence rate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate the distributed energy sharing
game among prosumers. We first prove that this game does
not satisfy the monotone condition, which serves as the
fundamental assumption of existing distributed methods for
the Nash equilibrium seeking of GNG. Then, we transform the
GNG to an equivalent optimization problem, which is solved
by the proposed distributed algorithm. Experimental results
with three prosumers show that the GNE can be obtained at a
fast speed. Simulations on 123 prosumers verify the scalability
of the proposed method.
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This paper offers a different perspective for seeking the
GNE in the GNG. If the monotone condition is not satisfied, it
is possible to transform the GNG to an equivalent optimization
problem. In our future work, it is interesting to investigate the
conditions of the equivalent transformation for a more general
GNG.
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